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TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW: INTEGRATING PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Robert Batey*
As indicated in another article,' my days of teaching first-year Criminal Law are
probably over. Before exiting, I would like to detail a few of the ways in which I tried to
introduce ethical issues into that course. Whenever possible, I used cases involving lawyer
defendants, or lawyers whose trial tactics ran afoul of the law, to show the kinds of messes
wayward attorneys can get themselves into. In this respect, one particularly rich area is the
law of theft, where I not only used lawyer cases, but also devised a series of hypotheticals
raising ethical questions for both lawyers and law students. However, my most serious
foray into professional responsibility came when discussing the law of mens rea and its
temptations for the subornation of client perjury.

The study of almost all the topics in Criminal Law can be adorned with cases
involving lawyer defendants or lawyers using questionable trial tactics. Not only do such
cases illustrate the topic being studied, they also strongly suggest that students ought to
avoid these lawyers' behaviors. Moreover, students might realize the scope of misconduct
in the profession they are about to enter and begin to understand the need for higher
standards of professional behavior.
Following the casebook I long used,2 the first topic covered in depth in my
Criminal Law course was the vagueness doctrine. For years, I included a note on United

Professor of Law Emeritus, Stetson University, College of Law. LL.M. University of Illinois 1976, J.D.
University of Virginia 1974, B.A. Yale University 1970.
'See Robert Batey, Teaching CriminalLaw: Buzzgroups, Short Writings, and Hypotheticals, STETSONU.

COLLEGE OF L. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Oct. 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291153 (last updated
Nov. 21, 2013).
2 PETER

W. LOW ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1986). For the last two decades, I have

combined excerpts from this casebook and its successor editions (with appropriate copyright notices) with notes
on cases, statutes, and other legal developments in a single ring-bound book. Almost all of the legal materials
mentioned in this article were presented to the students in this way. The local publisher of the book took
responsibility for all copyright issues and still managed to sell the book at less than the cost of the casebook. I
received no profits from any of the book's sales.
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States v. Rybicki,3 the prosecution of two lawyers for mail fraud.4 The lawyers had given
kickbacks to insurance adjusters regarding the settlement of tort claims.5 The prosecution
was unable to prove that the settlements were higher than they would have been without
the kickbacks and argued instead that the lawyers had used the mails to deprive the
adjusters' employers of their right to the adjusters' "honest services" under 18 U.S.C. sec.
1346. 6 The lawyers contended that sec. 1346 was unconstitutionally vague - an argument
subsequently accepted by the Supreme Court in Skilling v. UnitedStates. The same claim
8
was rejected by the Second Circuit eight years before Skilling. Rybicki thus adds a sidebar
on lawyer misconduct to the fascinating interaction of the "honest services" statute and the
vagueness doctrine.
Attorney misfeasance surfaced in the succeeding unit, on statutory construction.
In United States v. Baum,9 a criminal defense attorney concocted a plan to try to win a
reduction for his already-sentenced client, in which a former client would lure a suspected
drug dealer to the United States (in exchange for some money from the current client), but
Baum would get this cooperation credited to the current client by lying to the government
about the relationship between his two clients (that they were close friends) and about the
money.' 0 When this scheme blew up (because the current client decided instead to
cooperate with the government in its investigation of the lawyer), Baum was charged with
obstruction of justice." Baum countered that because the current client had already been
sentenced, there had been no "pending proceeding" - a requirement case law had read into
the federal obstruction of justice statute 2 - but District Judge Denny Chin (since
promoted to the Second Circuit) read the requirement broadly. Specifically, " [c]orrupt
attorneys pose a grave threat to our adversarial system of justice."1 3 In addition to
illustrating that policy considerations sometimes push judges to construe criminal statutes
broadly, 14 Baum thus also portrays attorney behavior that students need to be warned
against.
In teaching possession, I mentioned in passing Schalk v. State, 5 the prosecution
of a criminal defense lawyer who arranged a drug buy from a police confidential
informant in order to discredit the informant, who was an integral part of the case against
one of Schalk's clients.16 The courts rejected Schalk's many variations on the theme of
innocent possession, a concept that has been recognized in other contexts. 17 Another
lawyer prosecution given brief attention, in the unit on mens rea, is United States v.
Flores,'8 where Flores facilitated several transactions for his client that were ultimately

See 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003). See also Batey, supra note 1, at 9 n.21.
4 Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 127.
5

Id.

6 Id. at 128.

130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 126-27. Skilling's rewriting of the statute in order to save it from vagueness, which limits §
1346 to cases of bribery and kickbacks, would likely have upheld the convictions in Rybicki. See Skilling, 130 S.
Ct. at 2929-31. Thus Rybicki could be used in class discussion to tease out the meaning of Skilling.
9 32 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
o Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 643-44.
12 Id. at
648.
1" Id. at 650.
14 A few students may see how the same policy considerations affected the
resolution of the vagueness issue in
Rybicki. See UnitedStates v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 129-32 (2d Cir. 2003).
15943 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
6
Id. at 428.
17 See, e.g., Stanton v. State, 746 So. 2d 1229, 1229-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
S454 F.3d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2006).
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found to be money laundering.1 9 With the assistance of the client's testimony, the
government was able to convict Flores of conspiracy to commit money laundering on a
willful blindness theoy.20
Flores could also have been used in the unit on conspiracy, but instead I noted a
similar case, United States v. Sharpe,2 1 where willful blindness was used to convict a
lawyer who managed the proceeds of his client's fraud and let a coconspirator use the
lawyer's office in furtherance of the fraud.22 Sharpe can profitably be contrasted with
Vinluan v. Doyle,23 in which the appellate court enjoined the conspiracy prosecution of an
attorney for advising his clients, nurses in a contract dispute with their nursing home
employer, that they could resign en masse.2 4 The prosecution charged a conspiracy to
endanger some of the patients at the nursing home, specifically, chronically ill children on
ventilators.25 While such endangerment was certainly foreseeable to the lawyer, the
appellate court prevented his prosecution because "it would eviscerate the right to give
and receive legal counsel with respect to potential criminal liability if an attorney could be
charged with conspiracy . . .whenever a District Attorney disagreed with that advice." 2 6
So policy reasons overcame any application of willful blindness or of any other version of
the mens rea necessary for conspiracy.
Supplementing these lawyer defendant cases were a few cases involving much
paler forms of lawyer misconduct. Prosecutors frequently err in stating the burden of
persuasion to the juy.2 7 One flamboyant example involved a PowerPoint presentation:
The Power Point program begins with a blue screen. When the program
is started, a slide show begins in which six different puzzle pieces of a
picture come onto the screen sequentially. The picture is immediately
and easily recognizable as the Statue of Liberty. The slide show finishes
when the sixth puzzle piece is in place, leaving two rectangular pieces
missing from the picture of the Statue of Liberty-one in the center of
the image that includes a portion of the statue's face and one in the upper
left hand corner of the image.
The prosecutor went on to tell the jury that "[w]e know this picture is
beyond a reasonable doubt without looking at all the pieces of that
picture. We know that that's a picture of the Statue of Liberty, we don't
need all the pieces of the [sic] it. And ladies and gentlemen, if we fill in
the other two pieces" [at this point the prosecutor apparently clicks the
computer mouse again, which triggers the program to add the upper left
hand rectangle that includes the image of the torch in the statue's right
hand and the central rectangle that completes the entire image of the
'9 Id. at 152, 154-56.

Id. at 154-56, 159.
F.3d 852 (5th Cir. 1999).
22 Id. at 870-72.
23 837 N.Y.S.2d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
24
Id. at 82-83.
25 See id.
at 76.
20

21193

26
2

Id. at 83.
7 See, e.g., Bristol v. State, 987 So. 2d 184, 185-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) ("If you find the Defendant not

guilty, what's the evidence?"); Paul v. State, 980 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) ('[I]f [the defense
attorney] wants to present theories of how she believes this case should play out, there's got to be some level of
proof that [the state's star witness] was lying") (emphasis omitted). The ethical implications of Bristol are
doubled because the defendant's actual claim was that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecution's statement. 987 So. 2d at 185.
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statue], "we see that it is, in fact, the [S]tatue of [L]iberty. And I will tell
you in this case, your standard is to judge this case beyond a reasonable
doubt." The prosecutor argued such standard was met by the evidence. 28
The appellate court declared this PowerPoint unacceptable, 29 which emphasizes
to prospective prosecutors the need to rein in at least some of their more inventive
attempts to succeed with juries.
The same caution applies to defense attorneys tempted to make a nullification
argument. Hardingv. State30 approves the trial judge's actions in the following situation:
During closing argument, Harding's counsel told the jury that
"sometimes the law doesn't fit, sometimes it just isn't right. The ends
don't always justify the means." Counsel then baldly said, "I'm standing
up in front of you as Gary Harding's attorney and asking you not to
follow the law." The trial court immediately interrupted and stated,
"Counsel, that's improper and I'll instruct the jury to disregard, and if
they do that, that'll be a violation of your oath that you took when you
were sworn in to try this case. I don't want to hear another word about
3
that." 1
Cases like Hardinghelp to clarify the otherwise airy contentions surrounding nullification,
while also providing valuable practice lessons for the student.
A final instance of lawyer misconduct arose when I taught duress. In situations of
arguable duress, the prosecution occasionally seeks to convict both the threatener and the
32
threatened, in separate proceedings of course. This may cause the state to take
inconsistent positions regarding the influence of the threatener, as was the case in the
separate homicide prosecutions of Deidre Hunt and her abusive boyfriend Konstantinos
Fotopoulos.33 Hunt, the shooter, was the second to be prosecuted; her lawyer quoted the
prosecution's statements in Fotopoulos' trial about his "clear pattern of physical assault,
abuse, intimidation, and coercion --...
the direct and primary cause of Deidre Hunt's
criminal activity." 3 4 But the trial court refused to instruct Hunt's jury on duress, and the
appellate court agreed, because "duress is not a defense to homicide." 35 So the case not
only illustrates that hoary rule of duress law, but also instances what two justices of the
state supreme court, writing in Fotopoulos' appeal, considered a clear violation of due
process: "[I]t is repugnant to the tenets of due process and fundamental fairness that the
State would purposefully present differing renditions of the same factual scenario during
,36
separate proceedings, simply to obtain a particular result against codefendants." Cases

People v. Katzenberger, 101 Cal. Rptr 3d 122, 125 (Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 126.
30 736 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
" Id. at 1230. For a more permissive approach, see UnitedStates v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
32 See, e.g., Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122, 1125-26 (Fla. 2003).
" Compare id. at 1128-29 (discussing the State's assertion that Fotopoulos was dominating Hunt), with Hunt v.
State, 753 So. 2d 609, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing State's assertion that Hunt voluntarily
murdered Ramsay without duress).
34 Hunt, 753 So. 2d at 611.
5
1 Id. at 613.
36 Fotopoulos, 838 So. 2d at 1137 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only); accordIn re Sakarias, 106 P.3d 931
(Cal. 2005) (ruling similarly in a non-duress case).
28

29
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like these, and the others in this part, show that a professor can raise important ethical
issues while teaching the basic rules of criminal law.

Theft law provides a particularly rich environment for examining lawyer ethics.
Combining normal human avarice with the many opportunities attorneys have to separate
others from their property produces a wealth of examples of criminal, or at least unethical,
conduct.
The bottom line of my class on theft was that the complexity of the "common
law" offenses has caused many jurisdictions to adopt remarkably broad consolidated theft
statutes. To show the charging difficulties created by the old law of larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses - as discussed in Joshua Dressler's chapter on theft in
UnderstandingCriminalLaw, 37 portions of which were assigned for reading - I usually
38
gave the students a streamlined version of Graham v. United States. For example, A, a
criminal lawyer, induces his client to give the lawyer $2,200, telling the client that $2,000
of this money is necessary to bribe a police officer into dropping the charges against the
defendant. The officer drops the charges after talking to the lawyer, who keeps all the
money. If you were the prosecutor under the old law of theft, with which crime would you
charge A?
Most students would opt for larceny by trick, on the theory that A accepted the
$2,000 with the intent to defraud the client. 39 But this charge would be vulnerable to the
contention that A decided to keep all the money only while talking to the officer, in which
case the crime could only be embezzlement.40 One could even contend that title to the
$2,000 passed to the attorney at that time (as title to the $200 fee surely did), as payment
for services legal and illegal, which would make A guilty of obtaining property by false
41
pretenses. Conversely, if the court deemed A's false promise to bribe the officer a
promise of future conduct, A would be guilty of neither larceny, embezzlement, nor false
pretenses.42 The point of the exercise was not to teach the distinctions between the
"common law" theft offenses, but to demonstrate the need for reform through another
instance of lawyer misconduct.43
While some American jurisdictions took the Model Penal Code's more measured
approach to reforming the theft offenses (codifying each of the former crimes but granting
1 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 543-65 (6th ed. 2012).
" 187 F. 2d 87, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1950), discussed in DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 562.

' See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 550. The court in Graham accepted this reasoning. See 187 F.2d at 88-89.
40 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 560-6 1. The defendant in Graham unsuccessfully argued that the trial judge's
charge to the jury did not sufficiently distinguish larceny from embezzlement. 187 F.2d at 89-90.
41 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 561-64. Graham's primary contention
was that the prosecution should have
charged him with obtaining property by false pretenses. See 187 F.2d at 88.
See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 564.
43 A more recent lawyer case, Durie v. State, can be used to make the same point. 751 So. 2d 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
42

App. 2000). Durie, a plaintiff's attorney representing two men injured in a bar fight, attempted to avoid a
Medicaid lien on the amount recovered by one of his clients, by telling the insurance company that only 0.5% of
the $100,000 coming from the bar's liability insurance policy would be going to the client with the Medicaid
lien, when in actuality that client was slated to receive 80% of the money. Id. Larceny (and of whom)?
Embezzlement? Obtaining property by false pretenses? None of the above? Another example is Winters v.
Mulholland, in which a disgruntled 15-year associate copied and stored some client files without authorization
from his firm, and through an accomplice, tampered with client contact data in the firm's computer system. Upon
leaving the firm, the associate took client files with him and lied to some of those clients about the firm's ability
to continue to represent them. 33 So. 3d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Which "common law" theft offense is the
taking of the files? Are the associate's other actions any form of theft?
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the court the right to conform the charge to the proof at trial), 44 others have chosen to
45
create a single consolidated crime, usually denominated theft. Florida's theft statute is on
such law, modeled on a proposal by Professor G. Robert Blakey and a coauthor. 46 1
usually walked the students through its remarkably broad provisions:
A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or
endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to,
either temporarily or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from
the property.
(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any
person not entitled to the use of the property.
Breadth continues in the statute's definition of key terms. "'Property' means
anything of value," including "services," which are defined as "anything of value resulting
from a person's physical or mental labor or skill"'4 ; "property of another" is defined to
include property in which the defendant "has an interest" as long as someone else has an
interest in the property upon which the defendant "is not privileged to infringe without
consent."49 But the broadest provision of all is the definition of "obtains or uses":
[A]ny manner of:
(a) Taking or exercising control over property.
(b) Making any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of property.
(c) Obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future
act, or false promise.
(d) (1) Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining;
abstracting; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation;
conversion; or obtaining property by false pretenses, fraud, or
deception; or
0
(2) Other conduct similar in nature.

'

Despite the "kitchen sink" approach of this definition, the Florida Supreme Court
5
rather summarily rejected a vagueness challenge to it.

44 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 565 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 223.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft

1962)).
45 See generally Sherry A. Moore, Nevada's Comprehensive Theft Statute: Consolidation or Confusion?, 8 NEV.

L.J. 672, 673-74 & n.11 (2008).
46 See Goddard v. State, 458 So.2d 230, 234 (Fla. 1984). See also G. Robert Blakey & Michael Goldsmith,
CriminalRedistribution of Stolen Property: The Need for Law Reform, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1620-26 (1974)

(including a model statute). When one of my former colleagues contacted Professor Blakey by telephone, he
seemed surprised that Florida had enacted his proposal and implied that it might need some revision.
47 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014(i) (West 2013).
48 Id. § 812.012(4), (6).
49 Id. § 812.012(5). This provision, meant to deal with the question (among others) of whether a partner could be
guilty of stealing partnership property (famously raised in the classic case of Peoplev. Sobiek, 106 Cal. Rptr. 519
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973)), should have been used to decide Rigal v. State, in which a lawyer in dispute with other
lawyers at his firm pocketed checks meant for the firm. 2000 WL 348109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2000),
superseded by 780 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 200 1). The appellate court first decided that Rigal could not be
prosecuted for theft because a partner could not steal partnership property, but then changed its mind, holding
that Rigal was never a partner. Id. Neither opinion uses the definition of "property of another," which would
have reached the eventual result with far greater ease.
5o § 812.012(3).
5I Dunniganv. State, 364 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1978).
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To better understand the comprehensiveness of this statute and to return to the
theme of ethical conduct, the students were required to prepare oral answers to three
hypotheticals:
1)

2)

3)

X, a lawyer, holds a client's retainer in a trust account. Unable to
meet payroll one month, the lawyer takes money from the trust
account for this purpose (in violation of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct), intending to put it back into the trust account
within a month. Is X guilty of theft under Florida's theft statute?
Why or why not?
Y, an upper-class law student authorized to use a computer legal
research program, but for educational purposes only, uses the
program for compensated research for a local lawyer for whom the
lawyer is clerking. Is Y guilty of theft under Florida's theft statute?
Why or why not?
Z, a first year law student taking an exam, copies from the student
sitting next to him the answers to several multiple choice questions,
without that student's knowledge. Is Z guilty of theft under
Florida's theft statute? Why or why not?

Most students had little problem with the first hypothetical. X, whose actions
would at the least jeopardize his license to practice law, also made an unauthorized use of
the money. 52 Even though he had a trustee's interest in the money, the client also had an
interest on which the lawyer was not privileged to infringe. He might not have an intent to
deprive the client of any benefit from the property (as Florida is an IOTA state, with the
interest on most trust accounts going to a charitable fund that among other things provides
grants to law schools 53), X does intend to temporarily appropriate the property to his own

use.

54

Usually only a few students failed to see the guilt of Y (whose actions also would
violate her law school's contract with Westlaw or Lexis and thus risk suspension of that
contract, triggering serious consequences for her law school and her55 ). She knowingly
made unauthorized use of a service - the definition of which includes "[p]rivate . .
communication . . services,"56 and she intended both to deprive the company providing
the computer research program of the fees her employer would otherwise have had to pay,
and to appropriate the computer service to the use of another.
While acknowledging that Z has violated his law school's honor code, some
students typically balked at criminal liability for him. Z knowingly made unauthorized use
of the other student's answers, they would say, but are those answers property? Well, yes,
if property includes services and services are defined as "anything of value resulting from
a person's . . mental labor or skill." 57 But, they would follow up, doesn't their value
52

Note that the statute does not even require an unauthorized use, but that seems the only sensible way to read its

language.
5 Interest on Trust Accounts (IOTA), FLA. BAR,

http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/BIPS2001.nsf/ 1 19bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/b33301c604dd6bd
a8525669e004f836cIOpenDocument (last updated Nov. 30, 2012).
54 Florida's theft statute does not indicate whether its two intent requirements are conjunctive or disjunctive, but
courts appear to have read an "or" into the statute.
5 See, e.g., Pace Law, Lexis and Westlaw, http://www.law.pace.edu/lexis-and-westlaw (last visited Feb. 11,
2014).
56

57

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 812.012(6)(c)

(West 2001).

Id. § 812.012(6).
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depend on whether the answers are correct? Not under the statute's definition of value,
which refers to "market value . . at the time and place of the event. 5" They would finally
complain, Z had no intent to deprive the other student of the value of her answer, as she
would get credit (or not) regardless of Z's answer. At this point, other students who
understood the curving of grades would begin to howl, while the calmer members of the
class would point out that in any event Z did have the intent to appropriate the answers to
her own use.
I would usually finish the class by pointing out that prosecution of persons like
X, Y, and Z are exceedingly rare; it is not the language of the statute that prohibits them,
but prosecutorial discretion. 59 Fear of the courts' reaction to a prosecutor's pushing the
edges of the theft envelope, by strictly construing the statute or raising anew the question
of its vagueness, may explain some of this reticence. In addition to striking these by now
familiar chords, and teaching the tedious process of applying the elements of a criminal
statute to particular facts, this class also reminded students of the ethical burdens they
already bear and of greater ones in their future.
Just to drive the point home, I usually finished by giving the class a bouquet of
recent cautionary headlines. Here is the last batch: "Punishing Lawyers in Corporate
Frauds,"60 "Disbarred Attorney Pleads Guilty to Guardian Account Thefts,"61 "2 Lawyers
Charged in Claimed $1. 1M Client Embezzlement Scheme,"62 "Fla. Lawyer in $83M Real
Estate Fraud: I Didn't Think It Was Criminal,"63 "Chicago Lawyer Sentenced to 7 Years
in Prison,"64 "Former Boston Lawyer Sentenced to Four Years for Mortgage Fraud,"65
"Attorney Gets Four Years for Stealing."66 These headlines, plus the other uses of legal
chicanery in the theft class, tend to break down the distance that law students typically feel
from criminal defendants, reminding the class how easy it is to slip from attorney to client.

My most serious foray into legal ethics in the first-year Criminal Law class
resulted from a student comment. I was rather blithely using variations on the facts of
United States v. Short67 to teach the differences between the common law and Model
Penal Code approaches to mistake of fact. Specifically, under what circumstances would
51

Id.

§ 812.012(10)(a)(1).

5 See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1114-15 (9th ed. 2012).
60 Peter J. Henning, PunishingLawyers in CorporateFrauds,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, (Jan. 10, 2010),

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/punishing-lawyers-in-corporate-frauds/.
61

Vesselin Mitev, DisbarredAttorney Pleads Guilty to GuardianAccount Thefts,
LAW.COM (Nov. 6, 2009),

http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id= 1202435221538.
62

Martha Neil, 2 Lawyers Chargedin Claimed $1.IM Client Embezzlement Scheme, ABA J. LAW NEWS
Now

(Nov. 5, 2009, 3:29 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/2_lawyers
63

chargedin claimed 1lm client embezzlement scheme/.

Martha Neil, Fla. Lawyer in $83M Real Estate Fraud: I Didn't Think It Was Criminal,ABA J. LAW NEWS

NOW (Feb. 18, 2009, 2:09 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/fla._1awyer in 83m real estate fraud i didnt think it was criminal.
64 Larry Neumeister, Chicago Lawyer Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison, U-T SAN DIEGO (Jan. 14, 2010, 11:54

AM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/jan/14/chicago-lawyer-sentenced-to-7-years-in-prison/.
Sheri Qualters, Former Boston Lawyer Sentenced to Four Years for Mortgage Fraud, LAW.COM (May 18,
2011),

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/articlejsp?id= 120249438 1380&FormerBostonLawyer Sentencedto_4_Years_f
or Mortgage Fraud.
Todd Ruger, Attorney Gets Four Years for Stealing, SARASOTAHERALD-TRIB., Jan. 27, 2011, at BNL,

available at http://www.hemldtribune.com/article/20110127/ARTICLE/ 101271047?p=2&tc=pg.
674 U.S.C.M.A. 437 (1954) (deciding case of drunken soldier in occupied Japan who physically accosts a young
Japanese woman, claiming to believe she was a prostitute and that he was trying to agree with her on a price).
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Short's mistaken belief in consent be a defense if Short were charged with assault with
intent to rape at common law (the actual case)? If Short were charged with rape at
common law (assuming contrary to the actual case that penetration did occur)? If Short
were charged with rape under the Model Penal Code (again assuming penetration)?
Discussing the last hypothetical, I drew out the answer that his mistake would be a defense
if it negated the consciousness of risk necessary for recklessness, the minimum required
culpability for rape under the Code,68 at the end of which I said something careless like,
"What would you say to your client?" The naive reply I got from a very good student was,
"I would tell Short to say that it never occurred to him that Tomobe was not consenting to
his actions." I knew in a flash that I had to include a class on the ethical perils of client
perury.
I would set up that class by asking the students to prepare an answer to a
somewhat more careful version of my client advice question,69 but I also required them to
read the relevant portions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct7 o as well as an
excerpted version of "Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions"71 before answering. Thus primed, I began the class by
cautioning the students not to follow what I consider natural human behavior - to be as
helpful to the client as possible, by telling him about the legal significance of his lack of
consciousness of the risk of non-consent. Both ethical considerations and the law
regarding subornation of perjury require criminal defense attorneys to behave in a much
less straightforward way.
To illustrate the point, I showed clips from Otto Preminger's great trial film
Anatomy of a Murder. 72 First, the discussion between the defense attorney (James Stewart)
and his disbarred friend (Arthur O'Connell) about their prospective client (Ben Gazzara),
an Air Force officer accused of murdering the man who had allegedly raped the officer's
wife (Lee Remick) some hours before the killing. In the discussion the friend suggests that
the lawyer give his client "a chance" to find a defense by describing the relevant law to
him. Second, a subsequent discussion with the would-be client, in which the lawyer
nudges 73 the client toward facts that would support an insanity plea (punctuated by the
client's hilarious question, "Am I getting warmer?"). Third, a later brief conference in
6

1See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(3), 2.04(1(a), 213(1)(a) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
69 "If you were the defense attorney for Short in [my third hypothetical], speaking to your client before he has

told his side of the story to anyone, how would you advise him?"
70 I used excerpts from Florida's versions of rules. See FLA. STAT. ANN. Bar Ch. 4 - 1.1 (West 2013)
(Competence), 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), 2.1 (Advisor), 3.3 (Candor
toward the Tribunal), 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor), and 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third
Persons) and from Florida's comments to rules 1.6 and 3.3. For additional excerpts I should have included, see
infra note 91.
71 See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest

Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). This brief article needs only minor excerpting: a reference to the
supersession of the Canons of Ethics, on which Freedman relies, by first the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and then the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; removal of Freedman's discussions of the
defense attorney unwilling on ethical grounds to enter a guilty plea for a client whom the lawyer believes
innocent, made irrelevant by the Supreme Court's implicit approval of such behavior in North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); and deletion of the postscript, which replies to criticisms from other members of the
symposium in which the article appeared.
72 See ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959). Freedman's article discusses the novel on which the
movie is based. See Freedman,supra note 71, at 1481-82 (citing Robert TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER
(1958)). A far more brief discussion of this movie appears in Robert Batey, Literature in a Criminal Law
Course: Aeschylus, Burgess, Oates, Camus, Poe, andMelville, 22 LEGAL STUDS. F. 45, 75-76 (1998).

7 The lawyer in the novel is more direct than the one in the movie, see Traver, supra note 72, at 20-49, though
not as direct as Freedman's paraphrase of the novel, see Freedman,supra note 71, at 1481.
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which the now well-schooled client describes his irresistible-impulse state of mind,
74
causing the lawyer to (finally) accept his case.
Film almost always captures the students' attention, and the novelty of a rather
grainy black-and-white video helps. Turning the students to a discussion of Freedman's
article, I began with a basic question - if a criminal trial is a search for truth, what
obligation does the defendant have to participate in that search? The answer Freedman
provides is clear. None at all.7 If even a guilty defendant has the right to force the state to
prove her guilt, the defense lawyer's duty of competent representation requires a zealous
challenge to that proof.76 This makes the answer to Freedman's first "hard" question rather
easy. It is "proper to cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting the reliability or
77
credibility of an adverse witness whom you know to be telling the truth."
The defendant's sole obligation to the search for truth in a criminal trial is not to
commit perjury. 7 Not only may the client be guilty, but anyone who counsels the client to
commit perjury, including her defense attorney, may be prosecuted for subornation of
perjury.79 The natural-human-behavior response in advising a client like Short, as well as
my good student's naive response to my careless question, could be a path to prison.
Having made this point, I shifted to Freedman's more complicated issue, the problem of
the criminal defense attorney who merely knows, rather than suggests, that his client (or
some other defense witness) is about to commit perjury.so
In 1966, Freedman argued that a defense lawyer who knows 8 a witness is
committing perjury should not suffer ethical punishment for calling that witness and
questioning her like any other witness.8 2 He reasoned that the duty of maintaining client
confidentiality requires this conduct 83 because the knowledge that perjury is being
committed almost always comes from a confidential disclosure by the client. For even
making this radical suggestion (in a speech to some members of the District of Columbia

74 ANATOMY OF A MURDER, supra note 72.
776 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1471.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004). Freedman's reliance on the now superseded Canons of
Ethics is helpful, because they explicitly include the obligation of "warm zeal," which the Model Rules now
subsume in the concept of "competent representation." See Freedman,supra note 71, at 1470 (quoting CANONS
OFPROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908)).

77 Freedman, supra note 71, at 1469, 1474-75. The requirement of zealous advocacy thus trumps Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4, entitled "Respect for the Rights of Third Persons." For another perspective on this
question, see Eleanor W. Myers & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discreditingthe Truthful Witness: Demonstratingthe
Reality ofAdversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1055 (2000).
78 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1471.
See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 69-79 (3d ed. 1999).

As a few previous examples indicate, prosecutors seem especially interested in going after defense attorneys,
even to the point of making plea deals with the client in exchange for testimony against the defense attorney. See
also supra text accompanying notes 11 & 20.
'o "Is it proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will commit perjury?" Freedman, supra note 71,
at 1469.
" Freedman rightly rejects the "how can you ever really know anything?" copout that some defense lawyers use.
See id. at 1472. Interest in the mysteries of epistemology is not a common trait among a very practical lot of
criminal defense attorneys, so its popping up at this point raises doubts. For some cases dealing with the
knowledge issue, see United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003); Farnbaughv. State, 778 So. 2d 369

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); State v. McDowell, 669 N.W.2d 204 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). See generally J. Vincent
Aprile II, Client Perjury: When Do You Know the ClientIsLying?, 19 CRIM. JUST. 14, 15 (2004) (offering more
examples of the criminal lawyer's dilemma).
82 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1475-78.
84

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2004).
Freedman, supra note 71, at 1475.
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bar), several Washington-area judges (including Supreme Court Chief Justice-to-be
Warren Burger) wanted Freedman disbarred or suspended from practice. 5
Every state rejected Freedman's contention, instead adopting some version of
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3.86 That rule and its comments outline a three-step
process for the lawyer who knows of potential perjury. First the lawyer should
remonstrate with the potential witness about the impropriety and danger of committing
perjury, 8 9 including the likelihood of being exposed by a prosecutor well trained in the art
of cross-examination. 90 If the remonstration fails, the lawyer should seek to withdraw
from the case,91 though as Freedman notes judges are usually quite unwilling (for reasons
both practical and ethical) to allow lawyers, especially appointed lawyers, to take this
second step.9 2 If withdrawal is not a possibility, the lawyer faces disclosure of the perjury
93
to the court.
In the words of the official commentary to rule 3.3, "The disclosure of a client's
false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense
of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury." 94 So lawyers
seek at all costs to avoid the knowledge of client perjury that will place them at the top of
rule 3.3's three-step slippery slope, and thus behave like the defense attorney in Anatomy
of a Murder, who advised the client about the law before hearing his version of the facts.
This tactic raises the third of Freedman's hard questions: "Is it proper to give your client
legal advice when you have reason to believe that the knowledge you give him will tempt
95
him to commit perjury?"

The proceedings against Freedman were ultimately dropped. See Freedman,supra note 71, at 1469 ni.
Regarding Burger's participation, see Paul R. Tremblay, MoralActivism Manque, 44 S. TEx. L. REv. 127, 138
n.24 (2002).
85

See, e.g., Variationsof theABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct Rule: 3.3: CandorToward the Tribunal,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dami/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/mrpc_3_3.authcheckda
86

m.pdf (last updated Aug. 16, 2013).
87

See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.3.

I would pointedly define this word in class and then made sure to use it in a multiple-choice question on the
final exam.
8

89

See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 6.

90 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1478. As Freedman notes in another context, such remonstration is
particularly likely to cause any client, but especially an indigent one with appointed counsel, to wonder whose
side her lawyer is really on. See id. at 1473.
9

See MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 2; cf id. 3.3 cmt.10 (mentioning withdrawal in passing). I

probably should have included pans of rule 1.16 and its comments in the assigned reading for the class on
criminal defense ethics. See supra note 70.
92 See Freedman, supra note 71, at 1475-76; see infra note 94. Some cases cast doubt on the withdrawal option.
See State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 2002); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. 2003);
People v. DePallo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 2000), aff'd, 754 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 2001).
9 See MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10.
94

Id. cmt. 11. For an example of how bad things can get, see State v. Chambers. 994 A.2d 1248 (Conn. 2010).
Chambers' lawyer disclosed and attempted to withdraw, but the judge instead allowed Chambers to testify in
narrative form and limited the defense's right to object during Chambers' cross-examination. During cross
Chambers admitted several times that he was lying. Prior to closing arguments, the defense attorney again
attempted to withdraw, because he could not ethically comment on Chambers' testimony in the defense's
closing. Again the judge refused, instead giving both the defense attorney and Chambers himself the right to
make closing arguments. Apparently throwing in the towel, the defense attorney gave no closing and convinced
his client to remain silent too. Chambers was convicted, and the state supreme court affirmed. See also Brown v.
Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 74 (Ky. 2007) (judge allowed defense attorney to leave the courtroom during
defendant's testimony; conviction reversed on grounds of ineffective assistance).
9 Freedman, supra note 71, at 1469.
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As Freedman points out, giving such advice "creates the appearance that the
attorney is encouraging or condoning perjury."96 Nevertheless, this conduct is widely
condoned.97 In support of this contention I show excerpts from "To Defend a Killer," one
installment of the 1988 PBS series Ethics in America.9 8 It consists of a roundtable
discussion in which Professor Charles Ogletree poses dilemmas for experts ranging from
Justice Scalia to several prominent criminal defense lawyers (at least one of whom was
subsequently disbarred). 99
Ogletree portrays a man who has killed his girlfriend, but his role in Wendy's
murder likely will not be discovered. 0oo He confesses to a clergyman and a psychiatrist
(two panel members), both of whom suggest that he turn himself in.101 I would begin
rolling the tape as he approaches James Neal, who won fame both as a criminal defense
attorney and as a Watergate prosecutor.1 02 Neal drolly advises that he wants to tell
Ogletree about the law before the lawyer hears Ogletree's version of the facts. Neal's brief
rendition of the law includes the statements, "If you tell me that you stabbed Wendy, I
can't put you on the stand and have you deny that you stabbed Wendy," and "don't go
around talking to any more preachers or psychiatrists." 03 "There are very few deaf and
dumb people in the penitentiary." 0 4
I would usually let the tape roll, as Professor Stephen Gillers, another panel
member, defends the conception of criminal defense that condones Neal's invitation to
perjury o0while acknowledging its "psychic toll,"106 followed by a philosopher who seems
horrified by that conception, which sparks stirring advocacy from defense attorney Jack
Litman.1 07 Stopping the video at this point, I would usually ask the students to ponder
whether they want to live with this psychic toll,os before commenting briefly on the much
96

Id. at 1478.

9 One might even argue that it is required. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT 2.1 ("In representing a
client, a lawyer shall . . render candid advice.").
98ETHICS

IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER (Columbia University Seminars on Media and Society 1989) (on

file with Annenberg Learner) available at http://www.learner.org/vod/vod window.html?pid=192.
9 See C. Vernon Mason, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C. VernonMason (last modified Dec. 12,
2013).

100

ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98.
Id. at 3:00-14:20.
102 See James F. Neal, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JamesF._Neal (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
1o3 ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98, at 23:40-25:15.
104 Id. See Robert Batey, Commentary: Symposium: CriminalLaw Defense, Ethics, and the Client
Who Plans to
101

Lie, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637, 637-38 (2010) for another hypothetical of client perjury, this time in the
sentencing context.
15

ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98. But note that Gillers disagrees rather vehemently

with Freedman's resolution of his second hard question. See Stephen Gillers, Monroe Freedman'sSolution to the
Criminal Defense Lawyer's Trilemma Is Wrong As A Matter ofPolicy and ConstitutionalLaw, 34 HOFSTRA L.

REV. 821, 823 (2006).
16 ETHICS IN AMERICA: TO DEFEND A KILLER, supra note 98. For a fuller version of Gillers' comment, see
Robert Batey, Alienationby Contractin Paris Trout, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 289, 302 n.67 (1994).

107 TO DEFEND AKILLER, supra note 98 at 25:15-28:30. In an attempt to balance this exchange (compared to
Litman, the philosopher blusters a great deal, but is undone mostly by an egregious toupee), I usually noted
Litman's much-criticized defense of the "preppie killer" Robert Chambers, Jr., with its many variations on
"blame the victim." See Jack Litman, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JackLitman (last updated Dec. 2,
2013) (describing Litman's criminal defense strategies).
los Demonstrating the psychic toll is a quote, included in the reading assignment for this class, from the
protagonist of The Lincoln Lawyer:

I headed back to the door, my steps quick. I hate being inside a jail. I'm not sure why. I guess it's
because sometimes the line seems so thin. The line between being a criminal attorney and a
criminal attorney. Sometimes I'm not sure which side of the bars I am on. To me it's always a
dead-bang miracle that I get to walk out the way I walked in.
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different ethical rules that apply to prosecutors.1 09 1 would end the class by using this
asymmetry in the professional responsibilities of prosecutors and criminal defense
attorneys as another example of the bias for liberty in American criminal law."10
I have never taught the Professional Responsibility course nor do I pretend to be
an expert in any of its topics."' However, I did feel the obligation as a teacher of Criminal
Law to at least alert future lawyers about the ethical issues they do and will confront.
Cases and hypotheticals involving wayward lawyers, especially in the area of theft, and
the foregoing brief foray into the problem of client perjuy were my ways of trying to
meet this obligation.

MICHAEL CONNELLY, THE LINCOLN LAWYER 15 (2005).
109 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004) (explaining that the prosecutor should not pursue a case
if she knows probable cause is lacking; prosecutor must turn over all information favorable to the defense). The
reading for this class also included citations to a few cases and several articles discussing prosecutorial
improprieties, most notably the Duke lacrosse rape prosecution, which resulted in the disbarment of district

attorney Michael B. Nifong. See, e.g, Prosecutorin Duke LacrosseRape Case is Disbarredfor Intentional

Misconduct, 81 Crim. L. Rep. 470 (2007).
110 See SCOTT TUROW, ONE L 311 (Penguin Books 2010) (1977), explaining that while initially frustrated as a
prosecutor by "the manifold ways in which the truth becomes distorted in a criminal courtroom," Turow became
"like Saul on the road,... converted . . [T]here was a moral vision at work here . . [W]e could not safely
deprive any human being of his or her liberty without first knowing that the provable facts could not be contorted
into a shape reasonably consistent with innocence."
..For that reason, I cited students to a number of articles discussing client perjury. See Monroe H. Friedman,
Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133 (2008); Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth,
and Honesty in RepresentingClients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 209 (2006); Evan A. Jenness,
Ethics andAdvocacy Dilemmas-PossessingEvidence ofa Client's Crime, 34 CHAMPION, Dec. 2010, at 16;
Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Deceit in Defense Investigations, 25 CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 36; L.
Timothy Perrin, The PerplexingProblem of Client Perjury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1707 (2007). See also Michael
Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the ClientIs Guilty: Client Confessions in Legal Ethics,
PopularCulture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 229 (2009). I also referred them to a broader
perspective on legal ethics. See Douglas Ammar & Tosha Downey, Transformative CriminalDefense Practice:
Truth, Love, and IndividualRights-The Innovative Approach ofthe GeorgiaJusticeProject, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 49 (2003). But see Cheryl G. Bader, "ForgiveMe Victim for I Have Sinned": Why Repentance and the
CriminalJustice System Do Not Mix-A Lesson from Jewish Law, 3 1 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69 (2003).
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